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Abstract 
The theory of optimum-currency-areas was conceived and developed in three highly 
influential papers, written by Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969). 
Those authors identified characteristics that potential members of a monetary union 
should ideally possess in order to make it feasible to surrender a nationally- tailored 
monetary policy and the adjustment of an exchange rate of a national currency. We trace 
the development of optimum currency- area theory, which, after a flurry of research into 
the subject in the 1960s, was relegated to intellectual purgatory for about 20 years. We 
then discuss factors that led to a renewed interest into the subject, beginning in the early 
1990s. Milton Friedman plays a pivotal role in our narrative; Friedman’s work on 
monetary integration in the early 1950s presaged subsequent optimum-currency-area 
contributions; Mundell’s classic formulation of an optimal currency area was aimed, in 
part, at refuting Friedman’s ‘‘strong’’ case for floating exchange rates; and Friedman’s 
work on the role of monetary policy had the effect of helping to revive interest in 
optimum-currency-area analysis. The paper concludes with a discussion of recent 
analytical work, using New Keynesian models, which has the promise of fulfilling the 
unfinished agenda set-out by the original contributors to the optimum-currency-area 
literature, that is, providing a consistent framework in which a country’s characteristics 
can be used to determine its optimal exchange-rate regime. 
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1. Introduction 
The theory of optimum-currency-areas has long been the subject of academic 
research and the object of controversy. A wide range of views has been expressed about 
the usefulness of research into the subject. At one end of the spectrum, Krugman (1993, 
p. 18) has stated that ‘‘It is arguable that the optimum-currency-area issue ought to be the 
centerpiece of international-monetary economics’’. At the other end of the spectrum, 
Buiter (2000, p. 222) has argued that ‘‘the theory of Optimal Currency Areas. is, 
unfortunately, one of the low points of post-World War II monetary economics. ’’ 
The theory of optimum-currency-areas originated in the long-standing debate about 
the merits of fixed versus floating exchange rates (Ishiyama, 1975, p. 345)
1. Most of the 
participants in that debate, however, paid little attention to the differences in 
characteristics among economies in the real world, leaving the general impression that the 
respective cases made for either floating or fixed-exchange rates were equally applicable 
to all economies (Kawai, 1992, p. 25). In a triad of influential papers, Mundell (1961), 
McKinnon (1963), and Kenen (1969) sought to show that an economy’s characteristics 
should be a determinant of its exchange-rate regime
2. Those authors identified the 
characteristics that potential members of a single-currency area should (ideally) possess 
before relinquishing nationally tailored monetary policies and exchange-rate adjustments, 
and spelled-out the gains derived from the use of a single currency among economies. 
Other writers refined the contributions of Mundell, McKinnon and Kenen, adding to the 
list of characteristics relevant for identifying candidates for participation in a single-
currency area and providing more-detailed assessments of the benefits and costs of a 
common currency, but the original three contributors are usually credited as having laid 
the foundations for essentially all subsequent work in the field
3. 
                                                 
1 Cesarano (2006) discussed the doctrinal antecedents of the theory of optimum currency areas. 
2 Mundell was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1999, in part, for his work on optimum-currency-
areas. Surveys of the literature include Kenen (2002), Tavlas (1993), Mongelli (2002) and De Grauwe 
(2007). 
3 In this connection, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1197, p.762) stated that “the theory [of optimum-currency-
areas] has advanced only minimally since the seminal contributions of Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963) 
and Kenen (1969).”   6
In this paper, we examine two issues that have received insufficient attention in the 
discussion of optimum-currency-areas. First, although Mundell is frequently cited as the 
originator of the concept of an optimum-currency-area, the basic tenets of optimum-
currency-area theory had already been worked-out by Friedman by the early 1950s 
(Cesarano, 2006). In formulating the notion of an optimum-currency-area, Mundell 
appears to have been trying to refute Friedman’s ‘‘strong’’ case for floating exchange 
rates
4; in particular, Mundell’s objective was to identify criteria that would make the 
abandonment of a flexible exchange-rate regime less costly than that implied in 
Friedman’s paper, ‘‘The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates’’ (1953b). We show, 
however, that, by the early 1950s, Friedman had already recognized the importance of the 
criteria later set-forth by Mundell. Moreover, unlike other writers who anticipated the 
basic tenets of optimum-currency-area theory, Friedman thought that the inoperability of 
the criteria among countries in the real world established the case for separate currencies 
and flexible exchange rates among those currencies. In this regard, Friedman’s view was 
similar to that of Mundell.  
Second, we argue that, although the triad of papers by Mundell, McKinnon and 
Kenen contained important contributions in that they embedded specific criteria in a 
framework in which alternative monetary arrangements could be evaluated, the seeds of 
the long-standing controversy relating to the subject can be traced back to those papers. 
In particular, we argue that those papers embraced a number of conumdrums, including 
the following: the criteria enumerated by Mundell, McKinnon and Kenen led to 
conflicting and, at times, contradictory inferences; the underlying assumptions of the 
analyses used by those authors were tenuous, limiting the real-world applicability of the 
results derived; and the modeling structure used was a partial-equilibrium, static one that 
lacked an explicit welfare function by means of which the welfare implications of 
exchange-rate regimes could be compared. 
The remainder of this paper consists of six sections. Section 2 discusses Friedman’s 
anticipations of optimum-currency-area analysis. Section 3 describes the characteristics, 
identified by Mundell, McKinnon and Kenen, that potential members of a monetary 
                                                 
4 This argument was made by Cesarano (2006). See, also, Mundell (1997)   7
union should possess in order to make it feasible to surrender a national monetary policy 
and exchange-rate adjustment of a national currency. Section 4 discusses contradictions 
and inconsistencies inherent in the original optimum-currency-area approach, leading to 
the virtual abandonment of academic research in the field during most of the 1970s and 
1980s. Section 5 presents recent work that has contributed to revival of interest in the 
subject. A major impetus for renewed interest in the field has been the emergence of the 
view that the costs of foregoing national monetary policies and exchange-rate 
adjustments may not be so large as the original contributors to the optimum-currency-
area literature had thought. In this connection, we argue that Friedman’s contributions in 
monetary economics helped pave the way for the comeback of optimum-currency-area 
theory. Section 6 discusses empirical and analytical work on the performance of 
alternative exchange-rate systems, work that suggests new directions of research in the 
area of optimum-currency-areas. Section 7 concludes with a discussion of the research 
tasks in the field that need to be addressed. 
 
2. The origins 
  As Cesarano (2006) pointed out, during the late-1940s and the 1950s several 
writers – most notably,Lerner (1947), Friedman (1953b), Meade (1951), and Scitovsky 
(1958) – anticipated the basic tenets of optimum-currency-area analysis. In analyzing the 
effectiveness of inter-regional adjustment within countries, those authors drew attention 
to the crucial role played by single, central monetary and fiscal authorities and the free 
movement of goods and factors of production among regions in economic adjustment. 
Cesarano (2006, p. 726) argued that the above-mentioned authors believed that the 
classical adjustment mechanism would be effective in the absence of exchange-rate 
variations among separate, national currencies. In other words, the free movement of 
labor, capital and goods, and a single monetary policy, would negate the need of 
exchange-rate variations; the logical extension of this line of reasoning is that a single 
currency would be optimal for the global economy. Cesarano (2006, p. 726) also argued 
that what set Mundell apart from Lerner, Friedman, Meade, and Scitovsky was that, 
unlike the latter writers, Mundell (1961) took the view that the conditions (e.g., labor   8
mobility) needed to make the classical adjustment mechanism work might be inoperative 
both among countries and among regions of the same country. Under such conditions, it 
would be optimal to redraw national borders so that the classical adjustment mechanism 
could work effectively within regional areas. Mundell also thought that a separate 
currency would be optimal in each such area. In what follows, we deal with Friedman’s 
anticipation of optimum-currency-area analysis. In doing so, we show that Friedman’s 
doubts about the feasibility of a single, global currency was closer to the position of 
Mundell than suggested by Cesarano. 
2.1. Friedman (1952, 1953) 
Friedman’s (1953a, b) case for floating exchange rates was built on three main 
arguments. First, in light of the sticky prices and wages that characterize the real world 
(and made reliance on adjustments in wages and prices a lengthy and costly process), a 
system of flexible exchange rates would constitute an equilibrium system in which 
market forces act automatically to bring about external balance while averting the 
balance-of-payments crises that Friedman believed were an inherent feature of fixed-but 
adjustable rates (1953b, pp.161–167). Second, floating exchange rates would provide 
independence for monetary policy, largely protecting ‘‘each country from being infected 
by the monetary mistakes of the others’’ (1953a, p. 16). Third, a system of flexible 
exchange rates would be conducive to the removal of controls on the movement of goods 
and capital among countries, promoting multilateral trade (1953a, p. 16; 1953b, pp. 157–
158). 
In his paper, ‘‘The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates’’ (1953b), Friedman presaged 
Mundell’s identification of the conditions needed for the smooth functioning of a single-
currency area. Specifically, in his discussion of the sterling area, he considered the 
possibility of fixed-exchange rates among the members of that area and freely flexible 
exchange rates between sterling and other currencies:  
In a sense, any flexible exchange system is such a mixed system, since there 
are rigid rates between the different sections of one nation – between, say, the 
different states of the United States. The key difference for present purposes 
between the different states of the United States, on the one hand, and the   9
different members of the sterling area, on the other, is that the former are, 
while the latter are not, all effectively subject to a single central fiscal and 
monetary authority – the federal government – having ultimate fiscal and 
monetary powers. In addition, the former have, while the latter have not, 
effectively surrendered the right to impose restrictions on the movement of 
goods, people, or capital between one another. This is a major factor 
explaining why a central monetary authority is able to operate without 
producing serious sectional strains. Of course, these are questions of economic 
fact, not of political form, and of degree, not of kind. A group of politically 
independent nations all of which firmly adhered to, say, the gold standard 
would thereby in effect submit themselves to a central monetary authority, 
albeit an impersonal one. If, in addition, they firmly adhered to the free 
movement of goods, people, and capital without restrictions, and economic 
conditions rendered such movement easy, they would, in effect, be an 
economic unit for which a single currency – which is the equivalent of rigid 
exchange rates – would be appropriate (1953b, p. 193n). 
As noted, Cesarano (2006) argued that the logical implication of the thinking of 
those authors who believed in the efficiency of the classical adjustment mechanism is that 
a single, global currency would be optimal from the standpoint of global welfare.
5 
Whatever the merits of Cesarano’s argument with regard to other authors, we do not 
believe that this is a valid interpretation in the case of Friedman. In particular, we believe 
that Friedman’s thinking with respect to the need of separate currencies and flexible 
exchange rates among geographic areas, delineated on the basis of factor mobility and 
fiscal and monetary centrality was closer to the view of Mundell than to the views of 
other authors writing in the classical tradition. 
Underlying our view are two pieces of evidence. First, as the above quotation from 
Friedman, comparing the members of the sterling area with the different states of the 
United States makes clear, Friedman believed that there was a ‘‘key-difference’’ between 
                                                 
5 Cesarano (2006, p. 713) attributed this view to Mundell: ‘‘As Mundell (1961, p. 662) remarks, for the 
classics the optimum-currency-area was the world, because they deemed stabilization policies totally 
irrelevant so that multiplying the number of currencies entailed only a cost.’’   10
the two areas. Moreover, after describing that key difference between the United States 
and the sterling area, Friedman continued his appraisal of the potential for fixed-exchange 
rates in the sterling area as follows: 
The problem of maintaining fixed exchange rates within the sterling area 
without restrictions on trade differs only in degree from the corresponding 
problem for the world as a whole. In both cases the area includes a number of 
sovereign political units with independent final monetary and fiscal authority. 
In consequence, in both cases, the permanent maintenance of a system of 
fixed rates without trade restrictions requires the harmonization of internal 
monetary and fiscal policies and a willingness and ability to meet at least 
substantial changes in external conditions by adjustments in the internal price 
and wage structure (1953b, pp. 193–94). Many of these differences are, of 
course, themselves the product of the prior existence of fixed and stable 
exchange rates. Whatever their cause, there can, I think be little doubt that on 
balance they mean that a system of fixed exchange rates has more chance of 
surviving without trade restrictions in the sterling area than in the world as a 
whole. But, granted that the prospects are better for the sterling area than for 
the world as a whole, it does not follow that they are very good (1953b, p. 
194). 
Second, Friedman’s belief in the need of separate currencies among geographic 
areas, delineated on the basis of the existence of the criteria that would ensure smooth 
adjustment in the absence of exchange-rate variations, came across clearly in 
correspondence with Robbins in 1952. In a letter dated February 6, 1952, Robbins wrote 
to Friedman about the efficacy of single, global currency: 
In the completely liberal world, I am pretty sure that there would only be one 
kind of money; people would make their contracts in terms of whatever 
commodity they thought most likely to be reasonably stable in value and if 
you started with different currencies in different areas, it seems to me to be 
almost certain that there would be a tendency for one eventually to come to be 
chosen in preference to the others. This is surely not a mere fancy of   11
theoretical imagination. At the present time in Europe there can be no shadow 
of doubt that we all would make our contracts in gold if we were not forcibly 
prevented by law from doing so (Robbins, 1952). 
Friedman replied as follows
6: 
You may well be right that the end-result in a completely liberal world would 
be a single currency, though I am less clear that it would be a commodity 
standard. Whether you are [right] seems to be me to depend on whether there 
would be sufficient mobility of men and capital in such a world to prevent [the 
need of] independent monetary policies. Our rejection of flexible exchange 
rates covering the several states of the United States brings out that flexible 
exchange rates are not a necessary component of a rigorously liberal position 
and what seems to me the fundamental consideration - - the appropriate area 
for a single currency (i.e., rigid exchange rates) is that over which a single 
authority controls monetary policy and within which there is reasonably free 
movement of men, goods, and capital (Friedman, 1952b, italics supplied). 
The above quotation makes clear that, in the early 1950s, Friedman set-forth the 
basic core of what subsequently emerged as optimum-currency-area analysis. 
Consequently, Friedman clearly understood that, in an imperfect world, separate 
currencies and flexible exchange rates among different areas would facilitate adjustment 
among the areas. The domain of such areas was dependent on the mobility of the factors 
of production and goods, and the degree of monetary and fiscal integration. It was left to 
Mundell to embed the criteria identified by Friedman into the standard macroeconomic 
model of the time and to use that model to assess the macroeconomic costs and 
microeconomic benefits of single-currency areas. As we discuss in Section 3.2 below, an 
inherent feature of the standard macroeconomic analysis of the time was the use of 
macroeconomic policies to fine-tune the economy so that the goals of low 
unemployment, price stability, and balance-of-payments equilibrium could be 
                                                 
6 In his reply to Robbins, Friedman referred to the case for flexible exchange rates made by both himself 
and by Aaron Director, Friedman’s colleague at the University of Chicago. Director was also the brother of 
Friedman’s wife, Rose Director Friedman.   12
(simultaneously) achieved. It was Friedman’s rejection of that paradigm that set him apart 
from Mundell, as well as such writers as Lerner, Meade, and Scitovsky. 
2.2. Why were Friedman’s contributions overlooked? 
In addition to ground-breaking work on optimum-currency-areas, in his essay, ‘‘The 
Case for Flexible Exchange Rates’’, Friedman presaged developments in several other 
sub-fields within international-monetary economics. Among the latter international-
monetary subjects Friedman addressed in the article are the following: 
  Exchange-rate overshooting. Dornbusch (1976) is widely credited as having been 
the first author to set down the idea that, in a model with sticky prices in the short 
run, the exchange rate will initially react more to a shock to bring about an 
equilibrium than it would have if prices were flexible. Over time, goods prices 
will respond so that the exchange-rate overshooting is dissipated. Similarly, 
Friedman (1953b, p. 188) wrote: 
It is clear that the initial change in exchange rates will be greater than the 
ultimate change required, for, to begin with, all the adjustment will have to be 
borne in those directions in which prompt adjustment is possible and relatively 
easy. As time passes, the slower-moving adjustments will take over part of the 
burden, permitting exchange rates to rebound toward a final position which is 
between the position prior to the external change and the position shortly 
thereafter. This is, of course, a highly oversimplified picture: the actual path of 
adjustment may invole repeated overshooting and undershooting of the final 
position, giving rise to a series of cycles around it or to a variety of other 
patterns. We are here entering into an area of economics about which we 
know very little, so it is fortunate that a precise discussion of the path is not 
essential for our purposes
7. 
  The corner-solution hypothesis. Eichengreen (1994) is generally regarded as 
having been the first author to present the notion that, in a world of highly mobile 
                                                 
7 n his seminal paper on exchange-rate overshooting, Dornbusch (1976) did not refer to Friedman’s 1953 
article. Dornbusch did his graduate studies at the University of Chicago and is likely to have read 
Friedman’s paper.    13
capital, intermediate exchange-rate regimes are susceptible to speculative attacks 
so that the only viable options are the corner solutions of floating rates and hard 
pegs. In his 1953 essay, Friedman considered three exchange rate regimes – 
adjustable pegs (temporarily rigid rates), floating rates, and hard pegs (genuinely 
rigid rates). He argued that, unlike the latter two regimes, adjustable pegs 
encourage speculative attacks: 
Because the exchange rate is changed infrequently and only to meet 
substantial difficulties, a change tends to come well after the onset of 
difficulty, to be postponed as long as possible, and to be made only after 
substantial pressure on the exchange rate has accumulated. In consequence, 
there is seldom any doubt about the direction in which an exchange rate will 
be changed, if it is changed (1953b, p. 164). 
Therefore, 
The system of occasional changes in temporarily rigid exchange rates seems 
to me the worst of two worlds: it provides neither the stability of expectations 
that a genuinely rigid and stable exchange rate could provide in a world of 
unrestricted trade and willingness and ability to adjust the internal price 
structure to external conditions nor the continuous sensitivity of a flexible 
exchange rate (1953b, p. 164). 
Why have Friedman’s contributions in these areas been overlooked? We believe 
that the answer to that question probably lies in the nature of the 1953 essay. The essay 
arose from a 1950 memorandum that Friedman wrote while he was a consultant to the 
Finance and Trade Division of the Office of Special Representative for Europe, United 
States Economic Cooperation Administration. The essay was not intended for publication 
in a professional journal. It did not contain a theoretical framework nor did it provide 
empirical analysis. In 1952, Friedman submitted the paper for publication in the popular 
periodical, Fortune. In a letter addressed to John McDonald, a member of the Board of 
Editors of Fortune, Friedman wrote: 
[The paper] has been lying around primarily because in its present form it falls 
between two stools, and I have not been able to decide in which direction to   14
revise it or whether it was worth revising it in either direction - - it is too 
technical for popular consumption, not scholarly enough for publication in a 
technical journal (Friedman, 1952a). 
McDonald rejected the paper on the grounds that it was too technical for the readers 
of Fortune (McDonald, 1952); Friedman published the paper the following year in his 
book, Essays in Positive Economics (1953c).
8 
The point we wish to stress is that, although Friedman’s essay, ‘‘The Case for 
Flexible Exchange Rates’’, contained seminal contributions, the structure of the paper 
was such that the specific contributions might be overlooked. The ground-breaking 
insights were often presented as side remarks or footnotes and were not developed. Thus, 
although the paper was frequently cited during the 1950s and the 1960s as a key 
contribution to the subject of the choice of exchange-rate regimes, many of the specific 
arguments contained were ignored, possibly because Friedman did not expand upon them 
in the essay. 
 
3. Maturization 
3.1. Mundell (1961) 
More formally than had earlier authors (including Friedman), Mundell (1961) 
sought to show that an economy’s characteristics should be a determinant of its 
exchange-rate regime. Effectively, he aimed to identify the conditions which, if satisfied, 
diminished the case for flexible exchange rates. Conversely, he sought to demonstrate 
that, under some conditions, separate currencies and exchange rate adjustments would be 
ineffective. 
Mundell defined the optimum-currency-area problem as the determination of the 
geographic domain – as opposed to national territory – in which the goals of internal 
balance (low inflation and full employment) and external balance (a sustainable balance-
                                                 
8 It is likely that Friedman did not submit the paper to a professional journal. In personal correspondence in 
2003 to George Tavlas, Friedman wrote: ‘‘With respect to my article on flexible exchange rates, I have 
absolutely no recollection whatsoever of having submitted it to a journal for publication’’ (Friedman, 
2003).   15
of-payments position) could most easily be achieved. The author considered two 
countries, East and West, each with its own central bank, that form a currency union by 
pegging the exchange rate between their currencies. Mundell’s analytic setup included 
the following assumptions: (i) the East produces only automobiles and the West produces 
only lumber; (ii) there are no capital movements between the countries, their bilateral 
trade is initially balanced, and the countries begin at full employment; (iii) both 
economies are characterized by wage and price stickiness; (iv) the East experiences a rise 
in productivity, leading to an excess demand for the West’s product (lumber) and an 
excess supply of the East’s product (cars). The immediate impact of the productivity 
shock is to cause unemployment in the East, inflation in the West, a trade deficit in the 
East, and a trade surplus in the West.
9 
Mundell proposed three criteria to judge optimality. First, he identified labor 
mobility as the key attribute of an optimum-currency-area since such mobility reduces the 
need of nominal exchange-rate adjustment as a means of correcting the external 
imbalances. Second, if wages were flexible (instead of sticky) in both countries, the 
increase in demand in theWest would raisewages in that country, leading to a decline in 
the aggregate supply of goods and services (i.e., a shift in the aggregate supply function) 
and a rise in the price level while the decline in demand in the East would decrease wages 
in that country, leading to an increase in the aggregate supply of goods and services (a 
shift in the aggregate supply function) and a decline in the price level in that country. 
Economic agents in both countries would buy fewer Western goods and more Eastern 
goods, restoring equilibrium. Third, in the absence of labor mobility and/or wage-price 
flexibility, there exists an efficiency argument for nominal exchange-rate flexibility and 
separate monetary policies in the two countries. The upshot of Mundell’s analysis is that, 
in the absence of labor mobility and/or wage-price flexibility, the incidence of 
asymmetric shocks should be a criterion for assessing optimality. 
Mundell also enumerated several microeconomic factors supporting relatively-large 
currency areas. He noted that the efficiency of money as a medium of exchange and unit 
                                                 
9 Whether a rise in productivity in the East should result in higher unemployment in that country is 
debatable, as discussed below.   16
of account diminishes as the number of currencies increases under flexible exchange 
rates; the greater the number of currencies the higher the transactions costs (medium of 
exchange) and information costs (unit of account) of money. Mundell also pointed out 
that a large number of small currency areas could result in thin foreign exchange markets, 
making it easier for speculators to affect the market prices (exchange rates) of the 
currencies, thereby, making the conduct of monetary policy more difficult. 
In his paper, Mundell argued that the case for flexible exchange rates depends on 
the existence of ‘‘money illusion’’; in other words, an assumption underlying the case for 
flexible exchange rates is that the participants in the economy in question are willing to 
accept variations in their real income through variations in the exchange rate, but are not 
willing to accept changes in their real income through adjustments in the nominal-wage 
rate or price level (Mundell, 1961, p. 663). He also noted, however, that as a currency 
area grows smaller and more open to trade, the assumption of money illusion becomes 
increasingly tenuous since the proportion of imports in total consumption grows.
10 
3.2. Discussion 
Several remarks regarding the views of Friedman, those of other economists, such 
as Lerner, Meade, and Scitovsky, who anticipated optimum-currency-area theory, and 
those of Mundell, warrant further comment. First, Cesarano (2006) argued that those 
economists (e.g., Friedman, Lerner, Meade, and Scitovsky) writing in the classical 
tradition believed that the existence of national borders (i.e., differentiated governmental 
jurisdictions) prevents the classical open-economy adjustment mechanism from working 
properly. In other words, national borders deter the establishment of single, global 
monetary and fiscal authorities and the free movement of goods, labor, and capital; 
eliminate the borders, so the argument goes, and world welfare would be maximized with 
a single currency. Cesarano (2006) also argued that Mundell assumed that national 
borders are a given characteristic of the real world; unlike those authors who wrote in the 
(open-economy) classical tradition, Mundell believed that the optimum-currency-area 
                                                 
10 Friedman (1953b, p. 194) also referred to the importance of a currency area’s openness, as well as its 
size, without relying on the money-illusion argument: ‘‘The smaller extent of the area involved has 
somewhat divergent effects. On the one hand, it reduces the problem of harmonizing potentially divergent 
policies; on the other, it means that the area is subjected to larger strains from outside.’’   17
criteria might fail to operate, even among regions of a particular country. Therefore, the 
elimination of national borders would not be sufficient to establish an optimum-currency-
area. As Friedman’s correspondence with Robbins makes clear, however, Friedman did 
not speculate about the implications of the elimination of national borders. Like Mundell, 
for Friedman national borders are a given characteristic of the real world, a characteristic 
that points to the need of separate currencies and flexible exchange rates among 
countries. 
Second, we believe the Friedman’s views on the use of macroeconomic policies for 
domestic stabilization purposes differed fundamentally from the views of such writers as 
Lerner, Meade, Mundell and Scitovsky. The latter group of authors, writing in the 
Keynesian tradition, believed in the efficacy of activistic macroeconomic policies to fine-
tune the economy so that the goals of low unemployment, price stability, and balance-of-
payments equilibrium could be simultaneously achieved.
11 Friedman, in contrast, was 
critical of such views. For Friedman, the domestic economy is a self-equilibrating 
mechanism. For Lerner, Meade, Mundell and Scitovsky, in contrast, stabilization of the 
domestic economy requires governmental intervention in the form of activistic 
macroeconomic policies. We return to Friedman’s views on the role of monetary policy, 
and the relationship of those views to the optimum-currency-area literature, in Section5.2. 
3.3. McKinnon (1963) 
The idea that openness should be a criterion for judging optimality was further 
developed by McKinnon (1963). Assuming that the output of an economy is divided into 
tradables and non-tradables, the author examined the effects of a shock that changes the 
relative price of tradables and nontradables on the economy’s overall price level. He 
argued that if the exchange rate of a currency of a relatively-open economy changes in 
response to such a shock, the economy’s general price index, which (by definition) 
includes the prices of both tradables and non-tradables, would tend to fluctuate more than 
the general price index of a relatively-closed economy, reducing the ‘‘liquidity’’ (i.e., 
unit of account and store-of-value) functions of money. For example, suppose that an 
                                                 
11 It may be recalled that Meade and Mundell helped extend the Keynesian closed-economy model to the 
open economy.   18
economy experiences a negative terms-of-trade shock so that its nominal exchange rate 
depreciates. If the authorities of the economy in question aim to stabilize the general price 
level, the depreciation of the exchange rate and the resulting rise in the price of tradables 
require a contraction in domestic demand to push down the price of non-tradables. Other 
things being equal, the more open an economy – i.e., the larger the share of tradables in 
output – the larger the required contraction. 
McKinnon also argued that nominal exchange-rate changes in a relatively-open 
economy were not likely to be accompanied by significant effects on competitiveness 
because such changes would lead to fast and large offsetting changes in domestic wages 
and prices. That is, exchange-rate variations in a relatively-open economy would likely 
cause equal or near-equal variations in costs, depriving the flexible exchange rate of its 
corrective functions. The foregoing considerations led McKinnon to conclude that (a) 
relatively-open economies should peg their currencies, (b) open economies that trade 
extensively with one another would find it beneficial to form a currency area because 
such an area would be more closed than any of its constituent parts, thereby providing a 
greater buffer against the effects of exchange-rate changes, and (c) large (small) 
geographic areas are likely to be relatively closed (open) so that the size of the area could 
be a determinant of its optimal exchange-rate regime. 
3.4. Kenen (1969) 
Kenen’s (1969) paper analyzed the effects of shocks to particular export products 
(i.e., sector specific or industry-specific shocks)
12. First, Kenen developed the idea, set-
forth by earlier writers, that fiscal integration should be a criterion to judge optimality for 
participation in a single-currency-area; the higher the level of fiscal integration between 
two areas, the greater the ability to smooth asymmetric shocks through fiscal transfers 
from a low-unemployment region to a high-unemployment region. Second, extending 
Mundell’s argument that countries susceptible to asymmetric shocks should float their 
currencies, Kenen argued that, in the presence of labor mobility, two countries that 
possess narrow but similar production structures are suitable candidates for a monetary 
                                                 
12 Kenen presented his paper on optimum-currency-areas at a conference held in September 1966 at the 
University of Chicago. The publication outlet (Mundell and Swoboda, 1969) contains the proceedings of 
the conference, including summaries of the discussions of the papers presented by conference participants.   19
union comprised of two countries since a terms-of-trade (i.e., sector-specific) shock is 
likely to affect them symmetrically
13. Third, the author introduced the idea that product 
diversification can be used to assess the desirability of permanently-fixed exchange rates. 
Highly diversified economies, he argued, are better candidates for currency areas than 
less-diversified economies since diversification provides some insulation from the effects 
of sector-specific or industry-specific shocks, forestalling the need of frequent changes in 
the terms-of-trade via the exchange rate. Conversely, sectoral diversification might be 
needed to provide destinations to which labor has an incentive to move. 
 
4. Optimum-currency-area conumdrums 
As noted, previous authors had set-forth the basic tenets of the theory of optimum 
currency areas, but Mundell, McKinnon, and Kenen developed the insights of the earlier 
writers into a framework with which to investigate the way that alternative international-
monetary arrangements can influence the adjustment process. To summarize, the 
characteristics identified as crucial for judging whether it is optimal for two economies to 
form a currency union by those three authors are: 
  The degree of labor mobility and/or wage and price flexibility (Mundell) 
  The incidence of asymmetric shocks (Mundell) 
  The degree of openness and/or trade integration (McKinnon) 
  The size of an economy (McKinnon) 
  The similarity of economic structures between two economies (Kenen) 
  The degree of product diversification (Kenen) 
  The level of fiscal integration (Kenen) 
However, the framework developed by Mundell, McKinnon, and Kenen was not 
internally consistent and was fragile, as we discuss in what follows. 
 
                                                 
13 Kenen focused on two single-product areas that had highly mobile labor between them.   20
4.1. Conflicts and contradictions 
The various criteria can lead to inconsistent and/or contradictory results. Consider 
the following. (1) An economy that is small and open, suggesting the preferability of 
pegged exchange rates, might also possess a low degree of labor mobility with adjoining 
areas, implying the desirability of flexible exchange rates. (2) The openness characteristic 
suggests that small economies should adopt pegged rates since small economies are likely 
to be relatively open. Such economies, however, are also apt to be relatively 
undiversified, making them better candidates for flexible rates according to the 
diversification criterion.
14 (3) The relationship between economic size and the type of 
exchange-rate regime is not clear-cut for another reason. Consider two countries, East 
and West. Suppose the East is like Luxembourg and the West is like Germany. Economic 
developments in the East will have much less impact than economic developments in the 
West on union-wide economic aggregates such as real GDP. A regional central bank will, 
therefore, need to pay much more attention to economic developments in the West 
(Germany), so that the West gives up less than the East (Luxembourg) in terms of a 
nationally-tailored monetary policy.
15 Based on this line of reasoning, large economies 
are better suited for pegged exchange rates than are small economies, contrary to the 
inference of the openness characteristic which suggests that open economies are apt to be 
small and likely to be best served by fixed-exchange rates. (4) The diversification 
principle leads to a paradox. It suggests that two relatively undiversified economies 
should float their currencies. Yet, if the economies in question peg their currencies 
against each other, the new, combined currency union would be more diversified than its 
individual members, contrary to the inference drawn from the diversification principle, 
which suggest that such countries float their exchange rates. 
16(5) The diversification 
thesis can be turned around; it can be argued that those economies that are highly 
diversified can best afford to have flexible exchange rates, whereas undiversified 
economies are less able to deal with exchange-rate fluctuations. Therefore, it is by no 
means evident that diversification can be used to choose between floating exchange rates 
                                                 
14 See McKinnon (1969, p.112) 
15 This argument was made by Kenen and Meade (2008). 
16 This argument was made by Mundell (1969, p.111)   21
and pegged rates. 
17(6) As an economy becomes open to trade, it could become more 
specialized. That is, the removal of barriers to trade makes it possible to concentrate 
production so as to reap economies of scale (Krugman, 1991). Consequently, sector-
specific shocks might well become country specific shocks, suggesting the desirability of 
flexible exchange rates, contrary to the inference drawn from the openness criterion, 
which suggests that increased openness is conducive to pegged exchange rates. 
4.2. OCA analytics 
The theory of optimum-currency-areas was originally analyzed in a world 
characterized by the Bretton Woods System of fixed-but-adjustable exchange rates and 
limited international capital mobility. The analytical set-up used by the earlier researchers 
in the field assumed wage and price stickiness, the existence of a long-run and exploitable 
Phillips curve trade-off between inflation and unemployment, and the ability of the 
monetary and fiscal authorities to fine-tune the economy along the Phillips curve. 
Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963), and Kenen (1969) examined the effects of an 
asymmetric shock involving a switch in demand in a world comprised of two countries. 
Among the factors overlooked by those authors in their discussions of the choice of 
exchange-rate regime were differences in the level of economic development between 
two countries. In what follows, we consider issues that complicate considerably the 
choice of an exchange-rate regime. These issues are: (i) the nature of the asymmetric 
shock; (ii) freer capital flows; (iii) limits of fiscal policy; (iv) differences in the level of 
economic development between countries; and (v) the role of the underlying model 
structure used by the earlier writers in terms of its having limited the applicability of 
optimum-currency-area analytics in real-world situations. 
4.2.1. The nature of the asymmetric shock 
As noted above, in his two-economy (i.e., East and West) set-up Mundell assumed 
that the East, which produced cars, underwent a positive productivity shock, which, 
according to the author, led to an increase in demand by the East for the product (lumber) 
                                                 
17 See Mundell (1969, p.111-112)   22
produced by the West.
18 As a result, the East experienced a current-account deficit and an 
excess supply of labor. The West experienced a current account surplus and an excess 
demand for labor. 
An issue that arises – but whichwas not addressed in the earlier optimum-currency-
area literature – is the reason a positive productivity shock in the East would cause a 
switch in demand from Eastern products to Western products.
19 Contrary to the 
inferences drawn by Mundell, an increase in productivity should have the following 
effects on the Eastern economy: (i) an increase in the marginal productivity of labor, 
causing a (positive) shift in the demand for labor, (ii) an upward shift in the aggregate 
production function, and (iii) given (i) and (ii), a rightward shift in the aggregate supply 
function (in real output-real interest rate space). To the extent that the productivity shock 
is permanent, the marginal product of capital will rise in the East, leading to a rise in 
aggregate demand in the East. The net effect of the shock on output, employment, and 
trade in the East will depend on the underlying behavioral parameters. 
Be that as it may, a basic conclusion that emerged from the post-1960s literature is 
that the shock absorbing capacity of exchange-rate regimes is considerably more 
complicated than had been assumed in the early optimum-currency-area literature. One 
important result of the subsequent writings is that the costs of adopting pegged exchange 
rates and abandoning policy autonomy depend importantly on the nature of the shocks to 
which an economy is subjected and whether the shocks are permanent or temporary; the 
greater the number and impact of real shocks, the greater the benefit from floating rates.
20 
This result carries over to the degree of diversification; if a country experiences a shock 
to aggregate demand, a floating exchange-rate regime will provide insurance against the 
shock regardless of the degree of diversification. Correspondingly, if the underlying 
shock is temporary, the benefits derived from exchange-rate adjustment are smaller than 
they would be if the shock is permanent.  
 
                                                 
18 Mundell (1961, p. 659) wrote: ‘‘assume. that an increase in productivity (say) in the automobile industry 
causes an excess demand for lumber products and an excess supply of cars.’’ Kenen (1969, p. 43) repeated 
this example. 
19 To our knowledge, this issue has not been previously addressed. 
20 This argument traces back to Poole (1970).   23
4.2.2. Capital flows 
The introduction of capital flows into optimum-currency-area analysis alters the results of 
the original Mundellian framework in at least two important respects. First, following 
Mundell (1961), assume that a particular country experiences a positive productivity 
shock. Also, assume that the economy undergoes a relatively-fast growth rate and that, as 
a result, it runs a current-account deficit with the rest of the world. The rise in 
productivity is likely to induce capital inflows that make it possible to finance the 
current-account deficit without the need of devaluing the currency
21. Whether the current-
account deficit is sustainable will depend, in part, on whether (i) the increased investment 
associated with the external imbalance can be expected to provide a rate of return that 
exceeds the cost of borrowing, (ii) any increase in consumption associated with the 
imbalance is temporary and desirable for purposes of inter temporal consumption 
smoothing, and (iii) the fiscal position is appropriate in terms of both the level and 
composition of government spending, as well as the structure and mix of taxes and 
borrowing used to finance the budget. The key result, and contrary to the premise 
underlying the original optimum-currency-area analyses, is that a current-account deficit 
need not make a depreciation of the real exchange rate necessary. Second, to the extent 
that the exchange rates produced under a system of floating rates may reflect non-
fundamental noise, a floating system creates variability, uncertainty, and over- or under-
valuation of currencies. Capital mobility can, therefore, be a source of asymmetric shocks 
(through its effect on the exchange rate).
22 In the presence of genuine scientific 
uncertainty concerning exchange-rate determination, it is often difficult to interpret 
whether movements in real exchange rates reflect changes in underlying economic 
fundamentals or non-fundamental noise (Stockman, 1999). 
4.2.3. Fiscal policy 
The notion the fiscal adjustment can be used in a flexible way to smooth the effects 
of shocks has proved to be overly simplistic for several reasons. First, the systematic use 
                                                 
21 In fact, the capital inflows may lead to a balance-of-payments surplus and appreciation of the real 
exchange rate. 
22 A parallel argument applies to capital mobility under pegged rates. Under such a system, speculative 
capital movements show up as changes in reserves and money and credit growth rates rather than in 
changes in nominal exchange rates.   24
of fiscal policy can lead to problems relating to debt sustainability. Consequently, the use 
of the fiscal instrument in the present may constrain its use in the future (De Grauwe, 
2007). Second, fiscal transfers in the face of permanent shocks can have the perverse 
effect of locking resources in place, preventing necessary adjustment. Third, a country 
with large fiscal deficits and a high debt-to-GDP ratio that is in a monetary union can 
create negative spillover effects for the rest of the union, driving the union interest rate 
upwards and increasing the burden of financing government debts in the other members 
of the union. This situation can give rise to the formulation of control mechanisms, such 
as fiscal rules, to restrict the size of budget deficits and government debt in the union (De 
Grauwe, 2007).
23 
4.2.4. Real convergence 
The literature on optimum-currency-areas has not considered the appropriateness of 
a single monetary policy for countries at different stages of economic development. To 
explain the implications, consider two countries, A and B; country A is a mature 
economy with high per-capita income, while country B is at an early stage of 
development with relatively-low per capita income.
24 In a monetary union between the 
two countries, under which a regional central bank has been assigned the objective of 
price stability, country B could face the following situation: (i) relatively-high expected 
rates-of return on investment; (ii) low real (and nominal) interest rates (because of the 
low area-wide inflation rate maintained by the regional central bank)
25; (iii) with free 
movement of capital, factors (i) and (ii) can lead to overly-optimistic income 
expectations, a ‘‘wrong’’ incentive structure of investment (i.e., investment in high-risk 
projects that would not have been undertaken in the absence of low interest rates) and 
excessive domestic demand; and (iv) in light of the above, the economy concerned may 
eventually be faced with the need to undergo a prolonged deflation in order to regain 
competitiveness. The upshot of this line of reasoning is that the degree of real 
                                                 
23 This argument underpins the use of fiscal rules in the euro area. 
24 The following example is based on Kröger and Redonnet. 
25 Because of productivity differentials, country B would likely have a higher inflation rate than country A, 
so that a given area-wide nominal interest rate leads to a lower real interest rate in country B compared with 
country A.   25
convergence should be an important characteristic underpinning the choice of exchange-
rate regime.
26 
4.2.5. Model set-up 
The core optimum-currency-area paradigm was partial-equilibrium and static, involving 
the following elements: (1) a world comprised of only two countries; and (2) the absence 
of an explicit welfare function through which the various criteria can be evaluated. The 
two-country framework leads to the drawback that a ‘‘national’’ optimum-currency-area 
determined under this set-up need not coincide with the ‘‘global’’ optimum-currency-area 
(Kawai, 1992). Given the degree of spillover effects and economic interdependence 
among highly-integrated economies, the implications of national policies on world 
welfare should have been – but were not – considered by earlier researchers. The absence 
of an explicit welfare function led to a situation in which several, perhaps competing, 
welfare objectives were assessed. McKinnon (1963, p. 717), for example, described the 
objectives as follows: ‘‘(1) the maintenance of full employment; (2) the maintenance of 
balanced international payments; (3) the maintenance of a stable internal average price 
level.’’ These objectives are imprecise and raise the following questions.
27 How and over 
what time period is external balance defined? Why is price stability an objective and over 
what period of time should it be achieved? How is full employment defined? Such 
questions were not addressed by the early contributors to the optimum currency- area 
literature. The absence of an explicit welfare function and the static, partial equilibrium 
set-up, under which the optimum-currency-area criteria were assessed one at a time, led 
to a situation in which it was not possible to learn about the relative importance of the 
criteria or to assess whether participation in a monetary union could itself alter an 
economy’s structure. If there are inconsistencies among the criteria, the criteria need to be 
considered as a group and weighted. The earlier optimum currency- area paradigm, 
however, did not provide a mechanism for resolving conflicts among the criteria. 
                                                 
26 For this reason, the European Commission and the European Central Bank have pressed prospective 
entrants into the euro area to achieve a degree of real convergence prior to entry into the European 
monetary Union. See Buiter (2008). 
27 McKinnon was aware of these limitations. After presenting the above objectives, he wrote: ‘‘The idea of 
optimality, then, is complex and difficult to quantify precisely, so what follows does not presume to be a 
logically complete model’’ (McKinnon, 1963, p. 212).   26
5. The comeback 
Against the backdrop of the various conflicts, contradictions and other problems 
inherent in the optimum-currency-area framework, by the late 1960s and early 1970s the 
theory of optimum currency- areas began a decent into intellectual purgatory. At the 
above-mentioned 1966 conference at the University of Chicago that included most of the 
main contributors to the theory in the 1960s,
28 Johnson (1969b, p. 396) concluded the 
proceedings with the observation that the various criteria used to assess optimality had 
rendered the subject ‘‘too complex for its statement to be very illuminating’’; ‘‘the 
optimum-currency-area problem’’, he judged, ‘‘has proved to be something of a dead-end 
problem.’’
29 In a similar vein, Ishiyama (1975, p. 378), in a survey of the optimum-
currency-area literature as of the mid-1970s, concluded that, ‘‘the theory of optimum-
currency-areas is primarily a scholastic discussion which contributes little to practical 
problems of exchange rate policy and monetary reform.’’ For a period of about twenty 
years, from the late-1960s/early 1970s until the late- 1980s/early 1990s, academic interest 
in the theory of optimum-currency-areas was of second-order importance. Beginning in 
the late-1980s and early-1990s, however, the theory of optimum-currency-areas 
resurfaced as an active area of academic interest, an interest that continues until the 
present day. What accounts for the resuscitation of the theory? Clearly, events at the 
ground level had a major impact. The experience of the European monetary union, which 
is perceived to have been beneficial for its members, has been a catalyst for interest in 
monetary unions in regions outside Europe and in the conditions necessary for the 
adoption of a common currency among countries.
30 In addition, developments in 
academic thinking have played a role in reviving interest in optimum-currency-area 




                                                 
28 Mundell, McKinnon, and Kenen were among the participants. 
29 A similar judgment was made by De Cecco (1974). 
30 See Kenen and Meade (2008) for a discussion of recent initiatives aimed at regional monetary integration 
and the use of optimum-currency-area theory in that connection.   27
5.1. Monetary policy and credibility 
The focus of discussions on exchange-rate regime choice has shifted in recent years. 
Whereas the earlier optimum-currency-area literature dealt mainly with the country 
characteristics of the potential members of a monetary union, recent discussions focus on 
the credibility of monetary policy and alternative commitment mechanisms for policy 
makers. The earlier literature attached considerable weight to the ability of monetary 
authorities to attain a desired point along what was thought to be a stable long-run 
Phillips curve, with the implication that the loss of monetary policy independence 
imposes a high cost on an economy. The recent literature, in contrast, views inflation 
prevention as the main macroeconomic objective of a central bank, with a secondary 
objective of dampening business cycle fluctuations. 
Contributing to the shift in emphasis in discussions of exchange-rate regime choice 
have been theoretical developments over the past thirty years or so, which have cast 
doubt about the possibility of using macroeconomic policies to attain an optimum point 
along a long-run and exploitable Phillips curve. Several such developments are important 
to mention. (1) An implication of the natural-rate hypothesis is that the best that 
macroeconomic policy can hope to achieve is price stability in the medium term, 
especially in light of the long and variable lags associated with monetary policy actions 
(Friedman, 1968). A logical extension of the natural-rate hypothesis is that, in case of an 
external shock, the nominal exchange rate should be allowed to adjust to the new 
equilibrium level after the shock has rendered the old constellation of relative prices 
obsolete (Larrain and Velasco, 2001, pp. 22–23). (2) A major benefit attributed to 
monetary unions or hard pegs (such as currency boards and dollarization) in the recent 
literature is the elimination of the inflation-bias problem of discretionary monetary policy 
(Barro and Gordon, 1983). This bias stems from (i) attempt to over-stimulate the 
economies on average and (ii) the incentives to monetize budget deficits and debt 
(Alesina and Barro, 2001). Monetary unions and hard pegs are said to provide 
commitment to low inflation, changing agents’ inflation expectations so that the output 
and employment costs of attaining a low-inflation equilibrium are reduced. An 
implication of this literature is that the economies operating in an environment of highly   28
mobile capital should adopt either floating rates or monetary unification, but not 
intermediate regime solutions (e.g., Eichengreen, 2002).
31 
The upshot of these developments is that what had been identified as a major cost of 
monetary unification, namely, the loss of the ability to use a nationally-tailored monetary 
policy, may not be a cost after all. In fact, a key inference of the recent literature is that, 
for countries with histories of high inflation, joining a monetary union with a regional 
central bank can provide credibility, reducing interest rates and the unemployment costs 
of moving to low-inflation equilibrium. These developments have helped underpin the 
desire of some formerly high-inflation countries to join the European monetary union. It 
needs to be stressed, however, that, although the foregoing developments have 
contributed to a renewed interest in the theory of optimum-currency-areas, they represent 
a distinct shift in emphasis of that theory, that is, a shift away from examination of a 
country’s characteristics and toward the credibility aspects of alternative exchange-rate 
regimes. In addition, it needs to be noted that these developments were put forth in a 
literature that was, by-and-large, not directly related to the optimum-currency-area 
question. That is, revival of interest in the theory of optimum-currency-area reflected 
developments in a literature that had little to do with the subject of optimum-currency-
areas itself. 
5.2. The role of Friedman 
Mundell wrote his original article on optimum-currency-areas with the intention of 
making the debate about exchange-rate regimes, initiated mainly by Friedman, more 
relevant.
32 Yet, it was Friedman who, without intending to do so, contributed to a 
resurrection of Mundell’s conception of an optimum-currency-area, helping to elevate it 
to a position of policy centrality. 
As noted above, by the early 1950s Friedman had set down the basic elements of 
what would subsequently emerge as the theory of optimum-currency-areas. There was, 
however, a fundamental difference between the approaches of Friedman, on the one hand, 
                                                 
31 As noted, above, the argument that the only viable exchange-rate options are flexible rates or hard pegs 
was initially set-forth by Friedman (1953b). 
32 Thus, Mundell (1961, p. 663) stated that his objective was to carry ‘‘the argument for flexible exchange 
rates to its logical conclusion.’’   29
and those of Mundell, McKinnon, Kenen, and other early contributors to the optimum-
currency-area literature, on the other. As we have pointed out, Friedman believed that, 
under a fixed-exchange-rate system, wage and price stickiness in the real world made the 
classical adjustment mechanism both lengthy and costly. In this circumstance, flexible 
exchange rates would provide smoother adjustment of balance-of-payments imbalances 
than a system of fixed-exchange rates. 
Two themes that run throughout Friedman’s work are that (1) monetary policy 
actions are subject to long and variable lags, and (2) as a first approximation, money is 
neutral in the long-run.
33 Consequently, and in contrast to the short-term policy activism 
of the Keynesian models of the 1950s and 1960s, Friedman believed that monetary policy 
should aim only at achieving price stability in the medium term.
34 Although flexible 
exchange rates provide independence for national monetary policy, such independence 
was, in Friedman’s view, to be used to shield the domestic economy from inflationary 
policies elsewhere (Friedman, 1953a, p. 16), not to pursue domestic targets for the 
unemployment rate.
35 
Friedman’s 1968 address before the American Economic Association formalised 
the idea that monetary policy should aim at achieving price stability in the medium term, 
helping to pave the way for the subsequent revival of interest in the subject of optimum-
currency-areas. Specifically, Friedman’s contributions to the resurrection of optimum-
currency-area theory included the following: (1) the concept of a natural rate of 
unemployment, to which the unemployment rate returns following a disturbance 
(Friedman, 1968); and, (2) the ideas that the Phillips Curve should be augmented with a 
variable representing price expectations, and that its steady-state value is unity, so that the 
                                                 
33 As Friedman (1958, p. 199) stated, ‘‘The direction of influence between the money stock and income and 
prices is less clear-cut and more complex for the business cycle than for longer movements.’’ 
34 See, for example, Friedman (1951, p.263) 
35 The prevailing view in the profession at the time about the existence of a long-run trade-off between 
inflation and the unemployment rate was reflected in the following remarks by Johnson (1969a, p. 18): 
‘‘Flexible rates would allow each country to pursue the mixture of unemployment and price trend 
objectives it prefers, consistent with international equilibrium, equilibrium being secured by appreciation of 
the currencies of ‘‘price stability’’ countries relative to the currencies of ‘full employment’ countries’’. The 
view that the main cost of joining a monetary union is the loss of the ability to choose a desired point along 
a long-run Phillips curve was set-forth by Corden (1972) and Giersch (1973).   30
long-run Phillips curve is vertical (Friedman, 1968), ideas that are now part of 
mainstream economics. 
Friedman’s view that there is no long-run Philips-curve trade-off predated his 1968 
address. In a 1966 comment,
36 Friedman (1966, pp. 58–60) wrote: 
The basic fallacy is to suppose that there is a trade-off between inflation and 
employment; that is, to suppose that by inflating more over any long period of time, you 
can have on the average a lower level of unemployment. By speeding up the rate of 
monetary expansion and aggregate demand, you can unquestionably increase output and 
employment temporarily. only until people adjust their anticipations from a logical point 
of view, the true trade-off is between unemployment today and unemployment at a later 
date. It is not between unemployment and inflation. There is no long-run, stable trade-off 
between inflation and unemployment. 
In light of the above discussion of Friedman’s role in helping to revive interest in 
the case for hard pegs, what was Friedman’s view about the optimum exchange-rate 
regime? As noted in Section 2.2, in his 1953 essay, ‘‘The Case for Flexible Exchange 
Rates’’, Friedman presented the idea that the only viable exchange-rate regimes are 
flexible exchange rates and hard pegs. Throughout his career, Friedman was an advocate 
of both types of regimes (e.g., Friedman, 1969, 1973, 1974, 2000). 
37Friedman considered 
the particular choice between the two options to be dependent on such factors as the size 
of the economy and the degree of trade openness (Friedman, 1969, p. 365). He thought 
that larger, relatively closed economies should float their currencies. With regard to 
smaller, more-open economies, he argued: ‘‘My position has always been that a small 
economy should do one of two things: eliminate its central bank and really hard peg [as 
under a currency board]. or it ought to float completely’’ (2000, p. 418).  
 
                                                 
36 The comment was on a paper written by Robert Solow. The comment was made at a conference held at 
the University of Chicago in April 1966. In his comment, Friedman also presented the concept of the 
natural rate of unemployment. See Shultz and Aliber (1966). 
37 Friedman (1969, 1973) thought that small and open economies would likely have more effective 
monetary policies if they adopted a hard peg against the currency of a larger economy that had a track 
record of monetary discipline than if they followed a nationally-tailored monetary policy. For a discussion 
of Friedman’s views on exchange-rate regimes, see Hanke (2008).   31
5.3. Endogeneity of the criteria 
Whereas the early framework used to study optimum-currency-areas was static, 
seeking to identify the characteristics that an economy should satisfy prior to joining a 
monetary union (i.e., ex ante), much recent work, initiated by Frankel and Rose (1998, 
2002), has focused on changes in economic structure and performance that may result 
from participation in a monetary union (i.e., ex post). Endogenous optimum-currency-
area theory is grounded in the following propositions.
38 First, ‘‘borders’’ (broadly defined 
to include separate monies) constitute an impediment to trade. Monetary unification 
represents the removal of borders in that it is tantamount to a narrowing of distances and 
raises the incentives of agents within the monetary union to trade amongst themselves 
(McCallum, 1995; Engel and Rogers, 2004). The intuition underlying this view is that the 
introduction of a single currency eliminates exchange-rate risk (and, therefore, the cost of 
hedging), lowers information costs, and raises price transparency, reducing market 
segmentation and encouraging competition (Skudenly, 2003). Therefore, a common 
currency promotes, over-and-above what may be attained by pegged rates among 
separate currencies, reciprocal trade, economic and financial integration, and the 
accumulation of knowledge (De Grauwe and Mongelli, 2005). Second, there is a positive 
linkage between trade integration and income correlation (Frankel and Rose, 1998). 
Specifically, trade integration leads to more-highly-correlated business cycles because of 
common demand shocks and greater intra-industry trade, lessening the need of country-
specific monetary policies and reducing the cost of giving up a nationally-tailored 
monetary policy.
39 In contrast to the earlier literature, which focused on the number 
and/or severity of asymmetric shocks among economies as a criterion for choosing 
potential participants in a monetary union (i.e., ex ante), the endogenous optimum-
currency-area literature leads to the conclusion that participation in a monetary union 
itself reduces the incidence of asymmetric shocks among participants. 
The following comments on the above line of research are warranted. First, the 
view that the introduction of a single currency promotes trade over-and-above what 
                                                 
38 De Grauwe and Mongelli (2005) and Mongelli (2005) reviewed the endogenous optimum-currency-area 
literature. 
39 De Haan et al. (2008) reviewed the literature on the convergence of business cycles among members of 
the euro area.   32
would have taken place under a rigid exchange-rate regime has led to a large body of 
empirical work that examines the issue. The first such study was that of Rose (2000), who 
found that membership in a currency union tripled the size of trade flows among the 
participants in the union. Subsequent work, which addressed both specification and 
estimation problems contained in Rose’s study, have found that any trade-creating effects 
of a currency union are much smaller than Rose’s findings. For example, recent estimates 
of the trade creating- effect of the euro area are typically estimated to be in the range of 8 
per cent to 23 per cent (Rose, 2008). Although these results suggest that participation in a 
monetary union may provide endogenous trade-creating effects, it is important to point 
out that, while the theoretical literature can provide support for these results, it cannot 
justify effects of the size of the effects that have been reported in the literature. 
Second, an increase in trade integration between countries, say A and B, may lead 
to the export or import of business cycles induced by demand fluctuations through trade 
linkages because changes in income in country A, for example, will typically lead to a 
change in that country’s demand for country B’s goods. Yet, as noted earlier, standard 
trade theory predicts that as an economy becomes more open to trade, it could become 
more specialized in production, leading to higher inter-industry patterns of trade. 
Consequently, if business cycles are dominated by industry-specific shocks, trade-
induced specialization can lead to lower business-cycle correlations. Alternatively, if 
intra-industry trade dominates trades, industry-specific shocks may lead to higher 
business-cycle correlations. Analytically, therefore, the relationship between trade 
intensity and the co-movement of output is ambiguous. 
 
6. The performance of alternative exchange rate regimes 
An underlying implication of the theory of optimum-currency-areas is that, because 
different country characteristics are associated with different optimal exchange-rate 
regimes, the exchange-rate regime that a country chooses should matter for key welfare 
criteria, such as growth performance, output volatility, and inflation. What are the 
implications of empirical and theoretical work on the performance of alternative 
exchange-rate regimes for optimum-currency-areas? In what follows, we first discuss the   33
empirical and analytical literature on regime performance, and then draw inferences from 
this work for future research in the field of optimum-currency-areas. 
6.1. Empirical literature 
The recent empirical literature has compared exchange-rate-regime performance 
using the more than thirty years’ experience with managed floating and other currency 
arrangements following the demise of the Bretton Woods system of pegged-but-
adjustable exchange rates.
40 This literature uses both de jure classification reported by the 
IMF, which classified regimes according to what the authorities said they did, and de 
facto regime classifications devised by researchers, which attempt more accurately to 
capture the authorities’ practices based on movements in variables such as nominal 
exchange rates and reserves. The main findings of this literature can be summarized as 
follows. (1) Unconditionally and conditionally, it is difficult to discern a clear-cut 
relationship between per-capita growth and the exchange-rate regime. Conditionally, 
there is some evidence that, for advanced economies, the exchange-rate system either 
made little difference for growth or that floats registered higher growth rates than other 
regimes. For developing economies there is some positive association between pegs and 
growth. Those authors who examined the effects of a strong monetary policy framework 
found that such a framework, rather than the presence of a particular exchange-rate 
system per se, appeared to be a positive determinant of growth. (2) Both unconditionally 
and conditionally, pegged exchange-rate systems tend to be associated with lower 
inflation than other types of regimes, but the results are sensitive to the grouping of 
economies and the fact that many high-inflation economies have had floating rates 
because of the need of frequent adjustments of exchange rates. For upper-income or 
advanced economies, floating regimes tend to produce the lowest inflation. For lower-in 
come or developing economies, pegged regimes are associated with lowest inflation. (3) 
Unconditionally, all studies using de facto codings found that pegged regimes were 
associated with higher output volatility than were regimes with any flexibility. 
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In sum, the literature on the performance of alternative exchange-rate regimes 
indicates that the level of economic development plays a role with regard to the effects of 
the regime on economic growth and inflation. For lower-income (i.e., developing) 
countries, there is a positive association between pegged exchange rates and growth, 
although there appears to be no association between the exchange-rate regime and growth 
for higher-income (i.e., advanced) economies. For upper-income economies, floating 
rates appear to produce lower inflation, while, for lower-income economies, pegged rates 
are associated with lower inflation. Finally, pegged rates are associated with higher 
output volatility for all groups of countries, irrespective of the level of economic 
development. 
6.2. Analytical considerations 
In models without nominal rigidities, the exchange-rate system does not affect real 
variables (except real money balances). This result is the direct consequence of the 
neutrality or super-neutrality of money, even in the short run (Stockman,1999, p.1485). 
The situation is very different in the presence of nominal frictions (price and/or wage 
rigidities). The standard vehicle for studying the effects of monetary policy in the 
presence of frictions is the New Keynesian model. There exists a large body of literature, 
deriving from the Kollmann (1992) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) open-economy 
extensions of the New Keynesian model, that deals with issues pertaining to the 
properties and optimal choice of the exchange-rate regime. An important difference 
between this work and the earlier literature is that the former uses explicit, micro 
founded, stochastic general equilibrium models and welfare criteria that are consistent 
with the objectives of the agents operating in the model while the latter does not.  
The New Keynesian model uses diverse ‘’formats’’ and has produced rather diverse 
findings. Nevertheless, the main conclusion drawn from analysis using this model often 
echoes that of the traditional Mundell–Fleming model and for the same reasons – namely, 
that abstracting from non-fundamental fluctuations and speculative attacks, flexible 
exchange rate systems tend to produce better results in terms of welfare than regimes that 
severely restrict exchange rate fluctuations (Stockman and Ohanian, 1997; Benigno and 
Benigno, 2003; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000; Kollmann, 2002; Pappa, 2004; Canzoneri,   35
Cumby, and Diba, 2005). Moreover, independent national monetary policy performs 
quite well – that is, the gains from international policy coordination are negligible. 
There are several reasons to believe that the alleged superiority of monetary 
policies that feature activism and a flexible exchange rate, absent international 
coordination, may not be so general as it appears. First, it is typically assumed that the 
monetary authorities have complete information about the structure of the economy and 
the shocks to which it is subjected. Combining this assumption with the assumption that 
monetary policy is conducted optimally, that is, it maximizes the utility of the 
representative agent, often allows these models to generate activistic policy equilibria that 
replicate the efficient, flexible price (or wage) equilibrium. Consequently, when monetary 
policy is omniscient and omnipotent, it is not sensible to constrain it by making it target 
the nominal exchange rate. This conclusion holds especially when beggar-thy-neighbor 
effects associated with independent policies are not strong – for instance, when domestic 
and foreign goods are poor substitutes (see Pappa, 2004). Second, most of the existing 
literature assumes nominal-price rigidities. When prices are rigid, fixing the exchange 
rate incapacitates a mechanism that could bring about desired relative price changes, as in 
Friedman’s (1953a, b) case for flexible rates. While this adjustment mechanism could 
remain in place in the presence of nominal-wage rigidities, its role in existing models 
with nominal-wage rigidity tends to be limited, due to the combination of the 
assumptions of imperfect competition and a single input (labor), which transfers nominal-
wage rigidity into nominal-price rigidity (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000). Third, most of the 
literature assumes that prices are fixed in terms of the currency of the producers. 
With regard to the first two issues, Dellas (2006) showed that nominal-wage rigidity 
and imperfect information tend to favour a passive, fixed-exchange rate regime. With 
regard to the third issue, Devereux and Engel (2003), Duarte (2003), and Corsetti and 
Pesenti (2005) showed that fixing prices in terms of the currency of the buyer reduces the 
magnitude of the expenditure-switching effect relative to the volume of expenditure 
switching that occurs when the prices of tradables are fixed in terms of the seller’s 
currency, making the exchange rate an ineffective instrument for managing demand. 
When prices are set in the currency of the buyer, unanticipated movements in the nominal 
exchange rate do not affect the price of imported goods on impact, generating very low   36
pass-through of exchange-rate changes to consumer prices in the short run. In this case, 
optimal monetary policy implies that the nominal exchange rate does not respond to 
country-specific shocks. 
The comparison of alternative exchange-rate arrangements is typically carried-out 
in the context of single or two country models with a great deal of cross-country 
symmetry. Yet, as mentioned above, a ‘‘national’’ optimum-currency-area determined 
under a two-country set-up need not coincide with the ‘‘global’’ optimum-currency-area. 
To address this issue, Dellas and Tavlas (2005a, b) used a three country model, allowing 
for substantial asymmetries across countries, in particular, with regard to labor markets. 
That is, those authors assessed the implications of an optimum-currency-area 
characteristic, i.e., the degree of wage flexibility, and generalised the model setting to a 
three-country world so that externalities could be incorporated in the model. They found 
that, in terms of the benefits of monetary union, asymmetries among economies matter. 
Economies with relatively flexible wages lose (in terms of macroeconomic volatility and 
welfare) when they join a monetary union with economies with relatively rigid wages 
(Dellas and Tavlas, 2005b). Moreover, the authors found that symmetries among 
economic structures are also crucial in determining the extent to which the elimination of 
exchange-rate uncertainty between two currencies (attributable to monetary unification) 
resurfaces elsewhere in the global financial system (Dellas and Tavlas, 2005a). 
Research on optimum-currency-area theory using dynamic general equilibrium 
analysis is a recent development. This research, however, may shed light on the issue of 
asymmetries among economies using clearly-specified welfare criteria. Euro-area 
economies, for example, are at similar levels of economic development. This 
circumstance has made it easier to establish a monetary union without generating 
pressures for migration of labor and fiscal transfers on a scale that might prove 
unsustainable. As noted above, traditional optimum-currency-area theory has little to say 
about such issues as the level of economic development. Such issues, however, are likely 
to play a key role in future research into the feasibility of monetary unions. 
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7. Conclusions 
We have argued that the papers by Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963) and Kenen 
(1969) on the subject of optimum-currency-areas evinced a paradox. On the one hand, 
those papers contained key insights. They drew attention to (1) the different nature of 
adjustment for regions within an economy compared with adjustment among separate 
economies, and (2) the important role played by factor mobility in the adjustment 
process.41 Moreover, they demonstrated that the choice of exchange-rate regime should 
depend on a country’s structural characteristics, such as size, openness, and product 
diversification. In other words, the respective cases for either floating or fixed-exchange 
rates (or an intermediate regime) are not equally applicable to all economies, so that the 
exchange-rate regime that a particular country chooses may matter a great deal for 
macroeconomic performance. On the other hand, the particular characteristics 
enumerated by those three authors were mired in inconsistencies, contradictions, and a 
tenuous model set-up, leading to the virtual abandonment of interest in the subject of 
optimum-currency-areas in the 1970s and 1980s. Like the sirens in Homer’s Odyssey, the 
optimum-currency-area characteristics provided seductive appeal, but led to a ‘‘dead-
end’’. As we have also argued, the rehabilitation of interest in the subject reflects the 
experience of European monetary union and developments in academic thinking 
regarding the effectiveness of nationally-tailored monetary policies and the endogeneity 
of the optimum-currency-area criteria. Friedman’s contributions played a pivotal role in 
our narrative; Friedman’s work on monetary integration in the early 1950s presaged 
subsequent optimum-currency-area contributions; Mundell’s classic formulation of an 
optimal currency area was aimed, in part, at refuting Friedman’s ‘‘strong’’ case for 
floating exchange rates; and Friedman’s work on the role of monetary policy had the 
effect of helping to revive interest in optimum-currency-area analysis. 
Some of the problems with the first-round optimum-currency-area models may have 
reflected the limited tools available to macroeconomists in the 1960s. Subsequent 
developments in analytical methods and empirical techniques have, along with the 
experience of European monetary union, contributed to a renewed interest in the subject 
of optimum-currency-areas. Recent empirical and theoretical work on the performance of   38
alternative exchange-rate regimes suggests that the particular regime that a country 
adopts may matter for real growth, output volatility and inflation performance. The 
empirical work on the performance of an alternative exchange-rate regimes suggests that 
the level of economic development plays a role with regards to the effects of the regime 
on economic growth and inflation. Yet, traditional optimum-currency-area analysis has 
overlooked the role of economic development as a determinant of the exchange-rate 
regime. The analytic work on exchange-rate regimes provides a framework for weighing 
and comparing asymmetries among (more-than-two) countries in terms of the optimum-
currency-area criteria, and for specifying a welfare function containing explicit 
macroeconomic objectives. In our view, the use of modern analytical tools has the 
promise of fulfilling the unfinished agenda set-out by the original contributors to the 
optimum-currency-area literature, that is, providing a consistent framework in which a 
country’s characteristics, including the level of economic development, can be used to 
determine its optimal exchange-rate regime. 
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